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such offices is the obligation of an independent contractor, such as
the Illinois corporation in the principal case, then the spirit of KRS
141.120(4)(f) is defeated if merely negotiating the sales outside
of Kentucky will remove them from the Commonwealth's taxing
power.
William M. Dishman

DAMAGEs-PRoPiEY OF PER DriEM VALUATION OF PAIN AND SUFFEMRNG
BY COUNSEL IN CLOSING

ARGUMENT-Plaintiff was injured when a box

car, set in motion by the failure of a coupling device on defendant's

locomotive, struck the coal car under which he was working. In an
action for damages for personal injuries, the trial court ruled that the
defendant was negligent as a matter of law, and submitted the issues
of contributory negligence and the assessment of damages to the jury.
From a verdict and judgment of $20,000 defendant appealed. The
Court of Appeals held that the verdict was excessive with respect to
the following items of proof: (1) the effect of a pre-existing back
injury upon the plaintiffs present condition was not clearly established; (2) plaintiff was never hospitalized; (3) plaintiff had continued to perform certain occupations; and (4) proved medical expenses, including estimates of future treatment, were only $566.
Pursuant to Rule 59.01 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, a
new trial was granted for the sole purpose of determining the issue
of damages.' At the second trial, counsel was permitted to list various elements of plaintiff's damages on a blackboard in closing argument, including an amount for pain and suffering calculated at five
dollars per day for the length of his life expectancy. From a verdict
and judgment of $62,331 defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. The
court reasoned that, on the basis of the medical testimony presented at the second trial, the jury could have properly concluded
that plaintiff's disability was not attributable to his pre-existing
2
injury, but resulted solely from the negligence of the defendant.
In regard to the blackboard summation presented by counsel, the
court reasoned that it is no more speculative to suggest daily compensation for plaintiffs pain and suffering than it would be to suggest
a total amount. Further, since the jury must make a specific allocation of damages for pain and suffering, counsel should be permitted
I Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1958).
2"The evidence adduced in this respect [concerning plaintiff's pre-existing
injury] on the second trial was clearly more positive and would have been sufficient to sustain the original verdict." (Emphasis added). Louisville & N.R.R. v.
Mattingly, 339 S.W. 2d 155, 157 (Ky. 1960).
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to suggest specific figures in his closing argument. Louisville & N.
1LR. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1960).
Although the Kentucky court has previously recognized counsel's
right to jury argument on the issue of damages for pain and suffering,3 the principal case, permitting the illustration of a mathematical
computation of such damages, was one of first impression. Only six
courts have sanctioned,4 and six have condemned,5 counsel's use of a
mathematical formula in evaluating damages for pain and suffering,
since the first court's approval of this procedure in 1950.6 In view of
this equally divided and somewhat limited number of jurisdictions in
which the issue has been considered, there would seem to be no
discernible weight of authority. The purpose of this comment is to
enumerate and discuss the various arguments concerning the propriety of the per diem suggestion.
Among the reasons advanced by courts in opposition to the use
of the per diem argument are the following: (1) No fixed mathematical formula exists for correlating pain and suffering with dollar
values, since such elements do not admit of exact determination. 7
(2) Fair and reasonable compensation is to be determined by the

jury from the evidence relating to plaintiff's injuries; estimates of
3

Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W. 2d 637 (1944).
(1) Alabama: McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So.2d 315 (1958).
(2) Florida: Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
(3) Minnesota: Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d
30 (1957). (4) Mississippi: Four-County Elec. Power Assn v. Clardy, 221 Miss.
403, 73 So.2d 144 (1954). (5) Texas: J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231
S.W. 2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). (6) Washington: Jones v. Hogan, 351 P.2d
153 (Wash. 1960). See Johnson v. Brown, 345 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1959) (Pursuant
to Rule 51 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the argument may be used
only for the purpose of illustration under the court's strict admonition that such
suggestions are not to be taken as evidence). See also Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik,
234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956), affirming 141 F.
Supp. 388 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (an admiralty libel in which the court approved the
district judge's use of the per diem formula in calculating damages for pain and
suffering).
5 (1) Wuth v. Uited States, 161 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Va. 1958) (action under
the Federal Torts Claims Act). (2) Delaware: Henne v. Balick, 146 A.2d 394
Del. 1958). (3) Missouri: Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1960).
(4) New Jersey: Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138, A.2d 713 (1958). (5)
Pennsylvania: Joyce v. Smith, 296 Pa. 439, 112 AUt. 549 (1921). (6) Virginia:
Certified T. V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, S.E.2d 126 (1959).
6J. D. Wright & Son v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
7
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, -, 188 A.2d 713, 718-19 (1958). The court
reasoned as follows:
There is and there can be no fixed basis, table standard or mathematical rule which will serve as an accurate inaex and guide to the
establishment of damages awards for personal injuries. And it is
equally p lain that there is no measure by which the amount of pain
and s erin endured by a particular human can be calculated.
No market place exists at which such malaise is bought and sold....
[T]he impossibility of recognizing or of isolating fixed levels or
plateaus of suffering must be conceded.
4
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counsel tend to instill in the minds of jurors, figures not founded in
the evidence. The testimony of any witness as to the value of pain
and suffering is inadmissable. 8 (3) Defense counsel is prejudiced
by being forced to argue that pain and suffering are worth less than
claimed by his adversary, and in so doing fortifies the implication that
the law recognizes the use of a mathematical yardstickf
In rebuttal, those courts which have endorsed the use of the
argument propose the following reasons: (1) The very absence of a
fixed standard for the monetary admeasurement of damages is
sufficient reason for permitting counsel to exercise wide latitude in
closing argument. 10 Per diem suggestions are only illustrations"
and may be used by the jury as one method to avoid an abstract
allocation of the damages. 12 (2) The jury must assess the plaintiff's
damages by some process, and thus the argument that the evidence
fails to provide a foundation for a per diem suggestion is rejected.' 3
Although expert testimony as to the value of pain and suffering would
be inadmissable, a per diem suggestion is an inference properly
drawn from the evidence. 14 (3) Defense counsel, by drawing his own
inferences from the evidence, is free to place a lower valuation on
daily compensation, and may cast doubt on the validity of the method
by illustration and criticism.15
The various arguments previously listed will now be discussed
in order. First, it is generally recognized by a majority of courts'"
and writers' 7 that no fixed standard exists for accurately measuring
8 Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1960).
9 Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A. 2d 713 (1958).
o Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
11 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d S0

(1957).
2

1 Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
13 McLaney v. Turner, 267 Ala. 558, 104 So.2d 315 (1958).
14 Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.2d 144

(1954).
15 Note, 33 So. Cal. L. Rev. 214, 218 (1960).
16E.g., Braddock v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955);
Western & Atl. R.R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E. 2d 357 (1949); Vink v.
House, 336 Mich. 292, 57 N.W.2d 887 (1953); Dowly v. State, 190 Misc. 16,
68 N.Y.S. 2d 573 (1947); Clark v. Josephson, 66 N.W. 2d 539 (N.D. 1954)
Denco Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 560 (1951); National
Fruit Prod. Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S.E. 2d 757 (1946); Butts v. Ward,
227 Wis. 387, 279 N.W. 6 (1938).
The Kentucky court, at least prior to the decision in the principal case, has
recognized that no fixed rule exists for the measurement of damages for pain
and suffering. E.g., in Stanley v. Caldwell, 274 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Ky. 1954),
the court stated:
We have many times written that no rule can be laid down by which
damages for pain and suffering in a personal injury case may be accurately measured. At best, what is fair and right can only be left
up to the judgment and discretion of the jury....
17 McCormick, Damages 318 (1935), 1 Sedgwick, Damages § 171a (9th ed.
1912).
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the damages attributable to pain and suffering. Whether counsel's
request is presented to the jury as one for merely fair and reasonable compensation,' 8 a total amount, or a per diem allocation for
the duration of plaintiff's life expectancy, the inherent subjectivity
can not be completely eliminated from the determination of such
damages. The per diem argument only demands an accurate mathematical computation of the present worth of an amount reached by
speculation on the part of plaintiff's counsel. Since the per diem
formula contains one component based upon conjecture, the product
reached by its utilization must of necessity be speculative. The error
in such a rationalization is compounded by the fact that pain and
suffering vary from day to day in any one individual, and the intensity may well decrease in the future. 19
Second, although damages for pain and suffering are unliquidated and not susceptible to direct proof, the jury's award must be
supported by the evidence concerning the nature and extent of plaintiffs injuries.20 Therefore, advocates of the per diem argument reason
that counsel's suggestion is merely an inference drawn from such
evidence. 21 But, since no admonition or instruction by the court would
completely remove the figures suggested from the minds of the
jurors, the drawing of any inferences as to the value of pain and
suffering should remain exclusively within the province of the jury.
Clearly, if the argument is to be permitted, the court should point out
the distinction between the items of proof which are based upon
direct evidence and those supported only by counsel's "inference." In
the principal case, for example, counsel placed the following items
2
of plaintiffs damages on a blackboard:2
Pain and suffering, 360 X $5 = $1,830
$45,750.0023
per year X 25 years ......................................
Loss of power to earn money to date of trial ........
$14,000.00
Permanent impairment to earning money .......$50,000.00
M edical Expenses ....................................................
$ 873.00
$110,623.00
18 E.g., the Pennsylvania court has long condemned any reference to the
amount of damages for pain and suffering; counsel may only request fair and
reasonable compensation. See Joyce v. Smith, 296 Pa. 439, 112 Ad. 549 (1921);
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
1) Henne v. Balick, 146 A.2d 394, 398 (Del. 1958).
20Roland v. Murray, 239 S.W.2d 967 (Ky. 1951); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.
R.R. v. Nelson, 299 Ky. 19, 184 S.W.2d 108 (1944).
21 Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So.2d 144
(1954). See also 12 Rutgers L. Rev. 522 (1958).
-2 Record, p. 284.
23There are two obvious errors in plaintiff's calculation: (1) "360" was
chosen to represent the number of days in one year, and (2) "$1,830" may only
be arrived at by multiplying $5 by 866.
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In this blackboard summation, no distinction was drawn between
(1) proved and provable items, and (2) the item of pain and suffering, which, as a matter of law, is incapable of measurement in
dollar values.
Third, counsel for defendant is required to make the first closing
argument to the jury in personal injury actions.2 4 To suggest a lesser
sum as proper daily compensation, or to attempt to cast doubt on the
validity of the method, he must anticipate the manner in which his
25
adversary will present the issue of damages in closing argument.
Further, since there is no proof in the record from which he may fairly
anticipate the amount to be claimed as the daily value, defense counsel might argue a figure in excess of that contemplated by his adversary. If the defense attorney refrains from making an anticipatory
argument, the amount presented by counsel for the plaintiff will stand
uncontroverted since there is no opportunity for testing its accuracy.
The particular effect which the per diem argument will have on
jury verdicts for pain and suffering is difficult to ascertain. It has
been stated that it puts before the jurors figures out of all proportion to those which they would otherwise have in mind,26 and that
the exact figure suggested by plaintiff's counsel may be adopted,
producing excessive verdicts. 27 The decision in the principal case is
evidence that it is possible to triple a jury award by the utilization
of the argument.2 8 There is no sound reason for permitting counsel
to estimate plaintiff's damages for pain and suffering in any manner.
Such a suggestion, even under the guise of legitimate inference, has
the same effect on the jury as evidence and does not eliminate the
element of speculation from the allocation of such damages. The
adoption of any procedure should be predicated upon the desire to
diminish the jury's speculation and to ensure the plaintiff fair and
R. Civ. P. 43.02(5).
24Ky
2
5 In the principal case, counsel for defendant inquired of plaintiff's attorney as to his intention to use the per diem argument. However, nothing was

mentioned at that time to indicate the amount which would be suggested by

counsel in his closing argument. Record, p. 250.
plaintiff's
26
Henne v. Balick, 146 A.2d 394,398 (Del 1958).
27

See Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1955), in

which the court after ordering a remittitur, upheld a verdict for the plaintiff
of which $102,200 was awarded for future pain and suffering. This was the
exact amount set out on a chart by plaintiff's counsel in closing argument, which
was calculated at five dollars per day for the length of plaintiff's life expectancy.
28 It is interesting to note that by extracting the item labeled "Permanent
impairment to earning money.. ." from the blackboard illustration, supra at 595,
the total of the three remaining items is $60,623-a figure closely approximating
the jury s verdict of $62,331. The jury would have been justified in concluding
from the evidence that plaintiff had suffered no impairment to his permanent
earning power. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 339 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Ky.
1960).
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reasonable compensation for his pain and suffering. However, the
court has abrogated the jury's privilege of basing an award upon its
own knowledge and experience in favor of the speculation on the
part of one having a definite pecuniary interest in the size of plaintiff's recovery.
Jackson W. White
BIxclr TO INSPECr PuBLIc Rlxcoiws-William Owen, who was twice
charged with murder, was tried and convicted on one of the charges.
A motion for a new trial was filed. At a hearing on the motion,1
Owen requested that the members of the press be excluded so that
he could make a statement in the privacy of the judge's chambers.
The request was granted. In the presence of the judge, the court
stenographer and counsel for the defense and Commonwealth, Owen
made his statement which was taken in shorthand by the stenographer. The petitioner, a newspaper publisher, requested that it be
furnished a transcribed copy of these notes for the sole purpose of
disseminating the news. The judge and the stenographer refused the
request. Petitioner then demanded that a writ of mandamus be
issued compelling compliance with his request. Held: Petition dismissed. It was not determined whether the shorthand notes were
public records. However, the court held that even if they were, the
petitioner had no greater right to inspect them than any other member of the public. Since Kentucky has neither constitutional nor
statutory provisions for the inspection of public records, the right
of inspection is as it existed at common law, i.e., the one claiming
the right of inspection must have an interest which would enable
him to maintain or defend an action for which the document or
2
record sought could furnish evidence or necessary information.
'The majority opinion states that either the motion or the other charge
was called. The dissent asserts that this was a hearing on the motion for a new
trial. With respect to the holding, it is immaterial which case was called.
2 By way of dictum, the court excluded certain records from this doctrine
when it said:
[I]n order to effectuate the notice-giving purpose of various recording acts such interest shall hereafter be presumed as to the following records:
papers,
documents
and instruments
required
(1) Records
of all to
or permitted
by statute
be recorded,
or noted
of record, in
books
provided by puiblic funds for that purpose.
(2) All financial records required by statute to be kept in books
so provided. (Emphasis added).

Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. Curtis, 835 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Ky.

1959). Does this mean a conclusive presumption or one that is rebuttable? If
the true purpose of these records is to be effectuated, the presumption will have
to be conclusive. The court should have employed more definite language.

